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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16198

-vsALFRED BENNIE WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding
him guilty of the offense of robbery, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended.

After the appellant

had taken this appeal, he located an additional witness
allegedly able to corroborate the defense of alibi raised
at trial.

Appellant's petition for a writ of coram nobis

was dismissed by the trial court.

All proceedings were

presided over by the Honorable George E. Ballif, District
Judge.
DISPOSITION IN THE L01i'JER COURT
The appellant was tried before a jury by the Honorable
George E. Ballif, was found guilty of the offense of robbery,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and was sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah state Prison
for an i'ndeterminate term of from one to fifteen yearn.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the conviction
in the court below, as well as an affirmance of the order
dismissing the appellant's petition for a writ of coram
nobis for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of June 29, 1978, appellant entered
a Texaco Service Station owned by one Leo Carter, struck
the service station attendant, Jared Harper, twice on the
head,.and while Mr. Harper feigned unconsciousness, robbed
the establishment of approximately $143.00 (T. 17, 18, 19,
51).

Mr. Harper testified that the crime occurred at

about 9:55p.m.

(T. 16), and that he recognized the

appellant as a person who had entered the station office
earlier; about 8:00 to 8:30p.m.

(T. 15).

At the earlier

encounter, the victim and the appellant conversed for two
or three minutes while the latter looked at car seats in
the office (T. 35).

At the time of the commission of the

crime, the appellant asked Mr. Harper for change for the
pop machine and gave him a dollar bill to change (T. 17).
As the victim turned to the cash register, he was hit
on the head twice from behind and fell to the floor

(T. 17, 18).
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He remained onthe floor, though conscious, until the
appellant left and then telephonedthepolice (T. 20).
When the police arrived, Officer Berhow asked
Mr. Harper to describe the person who committed the
crime.

Harper described a male of medium height and build

with dark hair parted in the middle, a beard and moustache,
wearing a red pullover t-shirt and faded Levis {T. 65).
The following day, June 30, 1978, Mr. harper met with
Officer Berhow and gave him the same description as ·he had
given the previous evening {T. 67).

He participated in

the construction of a composite drawing (T. 56-57).

A

photocopy of the composite was made by the officer and the
original was dismantled (T. 58).
Soon after this process was completed, Officer
Berhow presented eight photographs to Mr.

Harp~r,

who picked

out a photograph of the appellant, whom he identified as the
perpetrator of the robbery (T. 60).

At the trial itself,

which occurred on November 21, 22, 1978, the victim again
identified the appellant (T. 14)

as the person with whom

he had conversed for two or three minutes between 8:00 and

8:30 p.m., and who had returned to the station at about
10:00

p.m asking fo~ change when the robbery and assault

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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occurred.

Mr. Harper testified that on the latter occasion

he was able to see the appellant's face for six to ten
seconds (T. 35).
At the trial, the appellant raised the defense of
alibi and introduced witnesses who testified that he was
elsewhere than the scene of the crime at the time it was
alleged to have occurred (T. 81,89,97,107,127).

Long

after the time for moving for a new trial had expired,
appellant petitioned for a writ of coram nobis on the
basis of newly discovered evidence, which petition was
dismissed by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE OF
UTAH WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
AND JUDGMENT OF GUILT.
The evidence produced by the state in this case.
was legally sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
The state showed through the testimony of its witness
that the robbery did in fact occur and that appellant was
beyond a reasonable doubt the perpetrator of the crime.
The testimony of Hr. Harper was weighed by the jury against
that of five defense witnesses who testified as to the
abibi defense, and in the excercise of the discretion
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allowed to it to determine the weight of evidence and
credibility of witnesses, the jury rejected the testimony
of the defense witnesses and returned a verdict of guilty.
This Court has consistently recognized that
judging the credibility of witnesses and weight of the
evidence is the exclusive prerogative of the jury and
that the jury's verdict must stand unless it clearly appears
that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubts
that the crime was committed.
P.2d 66 (Utah

1977~,this

Thus, in State v. Wilson, 565

Court, in affirming a conviction

for distribution of a controlled substance, stated:
[w]e are obliged to assume that the
jury believed those aspects of the
evidence, and drew those inferences
that reasonably could be drawn therefrom,
in the light most favorable to the
verdict. In order for the defendant
to successfully challenge and overturn a
verdict on the ground of insufficiency of
the evidence, it must appear that upon
so viewing the evidence reasonable minds
must necessarily entertain a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the
crime.
565 P.2d 66, 68.

[See also, State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d

292, 422 P.2d 196 (1967); State v. Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119,
499 P.2d 269

(1972); and State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350

p. 2d 14 6 ( 19 6 0) . J
This court has also held that on appeal from a criminal
conviction it will view the testimony as a whole in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

light most favorable to the state.

State v •. Jones,

554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d
466 (Utah 1975); State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 498
P.2d 357 (1972).
Appellant's sole ground for declaring that
the evidence in this case was insufficient to convict
the appellant is that since Mr. Harper had only a short
time to observe his assailant and appellant introduced
alibi witnesses, under no circumstances could the jury
have failed to find a reasonable doubt that appellant
committed the offense.

A rational assessment of this

case indicates no such compelling necessity for the
jury to have found a reasonable doubt of the identity
of appellant with the perpetrator.
First, Jared Harper had more than a fleeting
glance of his attacker.

He had seen and talked to the

person face to face for two or three minutes earlier
in the evening, and at the time of the attack he had
another six to ten second look at his face--sufficient
to convince him that it was the same person who entered
the office earlier (T.l5,35).

The contact between the

two at this later time took place in a well-lighted
office and was sufficiently close to allow the transfer
from appellant to Mr. Harper of a dollar bill (T.l7).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Even aftpr

~.tng

struck on the head, Mr. Harper was

able to give to police

a coherent description of his

assailant that evening and the following day, while
his recollection was still fresh, and he was able to pick
from similar photographs that of the appellant whom
he identified as the perpetrator of the attack (T.65,
67,60).

He was further able to identify the appellant

at trial (T.l4).

A reasonable mind could believe from

this evidence that the appellant was guilty.
Thus, only if the jury must have believed the
testimony of the defense witnesses as to the alleged
alibi, would the appellant be able to successfully
challenge the verdict upon insufficiency of the evidence
grounds, State v. Wilson, id. at 68.

Appellant's defense

of alibi was allegedly established by the testimony of
appellant and four other witnesses who each testified that
appellant either could not have been at the station at
8:00-8:30 p.m. or could not have been there at 10:00 p.m.
when the crime was committed (T.81,89,97,107,127).

All

of these witnesses were subject to challenqe for bias in
favor of appellant, being his father, mother, brother, and
close friend.

The prosecutor, Mr. Esplin, also established

on cross-examination of these witnesses, a likelihood that
their testimony was in part the result, not of independent
personal recollection, but of collaboration and fabrication
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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between the witnesses at a meeting in at~o~~p counsel's
office.

An instance of this was revealed in the testimony

of Mr. Powell, appellant's friend, to the effect that in
the meeting he suggested that appellant was wearing a
white shirt on the night of the crime (although Mr.
Harper had identified the perpetrator as wearing a red
shirt), and that no one else had any independent
recollection of this

(T.ll7).

Nevertheless, all but

one defense witness testified at trial that appellant
was wearing a white shirt (T.82,99,117,130).
Based on this impeaching cross-examination,
there was nothing to mandate that the jury believe the
defense witnesses, but such decision was properly left
to thei.r sole discretion to weigh credibility.

Appellant

has failed to meet the heavy burden of proving insufficiency
of the evidence to support the conviction of appellant.
POINT II.
THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE
APPELLA!TT 'tJAS NOT IMPER11ISSIBLY INDUCED
BY EXTERNAL INFLUENCES, BUT VJAS THE RESULT
OF THE \'JITNESS'S INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION.

Appellant challenges the participation of the
state's witness, Mr. Harper, in the process of constructing
a composite drawing as having been impermissibly suggestive
in the process of identifying the appellant.

Appellant

argues, briefly, that the composite drawing was the product
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Mr. "Harper's impaired memory and that his participation
'in its construction made it inevitable that the witness
would pick appellant's photograph in the photo display
and that appellant would be identified by Mr. Harper at
trial.

Appellant's counsel failed to object to Mr.

Harper's in-court identification of appellant (T.l4).
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4:
A verdict or finding shall not be
set aside, nor shall the judgment or
decision based thereon be reversed, by
reason of the erroneous admission of
evidence unless (a) there appears of
record objection to the evidence timely
interposed and so stated as to make
clear the specific ground for objection.
Unless this Court finds plain error in the admission by
the trial court of such evidence, the trial court's ruling
on admissibility does not present a ground for reversal.
State v. Smith, 45 Utah 381, 146 Pac. 286 (1915); State v.
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976).
The United States Supreme Court, in Stovall v.
Denno, 388
390

u.s.

u.s.

377

293 (1967), and Sim.'11ons v. United States,

(1967), has delineated the test which appellant

must meet to show that his due process rights were violated
by the identification process.

The Stovall case involved an

allegedly impermissible identification by the victim
while she was near death in the hospital in which the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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defendant was the only person presented to be identified.
The court held that under the extreme circumstances, this
"lineup of one" was permissible.

In Simmons, defendant

was identified from photographs by bank employees the day
after the robbery of the bank.

The Court stated the

applicable test as follows:
[C]onvictions based on eyewitness
identification at trial following a pretrial
identification by photograph will be set
aside on that ground (suggestiveness) only
if the photographic identification procedure
was so impermissibly suggestive as to give
rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.
390

u.s.

377, 384.

In findinq no violation present, the court

looked

at the fact that the witnesses observed the defendant in good
conditions for up to five minutes, that they made the
identification the following day while their recollection
was still fresh, and that photographic identification was
necessary because the perpetrator was still at large.
This Court adopted the Stovall and

Sin~ons

test

in State v. Wettstein, 28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084 (1972),
in which the defendant was convicted of robbery based upon
an in-court identification which was allegedly tainted by
an improperly suggestive photo display.

In finding that

even though defendant's picture was the only one within the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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group which depicted a man with a moustache, in the
circumstances this was not impermissibly suggestive,
The Court stated:
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 u.s. 293
(1967) the court stated that a claimed
violation of due process of law in the
conduct of a confrontation depends on
the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. The question to be resolved
is whether the suggestive elements in the
identification procedure made it all but
inevitable that the witness would identify
defendant, whether or not he was, in fact,
''the man." In Simmons v. United States,
388 U.S. 293 (1967), the court suggested
certain questions be considered in an
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in an identification procedure.
First, was there justification for using
the procedure; was there a necessity for
using the type of identification employed;
were the circumstances of an urgent character?
Second, under the circumstances was there a
chance that the procedure utilized would lead
to misidentification? The court mentioned
factors such as the opportunity and length
of time that the witness had to observe the
accused, the period of time of the incident
to the identification, i.e. was the memory
still fresh?
501 P.2d at 1084, 1087.
A year later, in State v. Volberding, 30 Utah 2d
257, 516 P.2d 359 (1973), this Court was again confronted
with an appeal based upon an allegedly improper in-court
identification.

The defendant was convicted of petty

larceny after taking money from a bar.

The bartender and

his wife, after seeing the defendant for about one hour
when the crime was coffiiTlitted, picked his photograph from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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,
a group of six to eight the following day while their
memoriea1>1Were still fresh.

Again looking to the totality

of the circumstances, the court held that the identification
procedure was permissible.
In the most recent United States Supreme Court
decision on this issue, Manson v. Braithwaite, 432

u.s.

98

(1977), the Court reaffirmed Stovall in holding that the
in-court identification of defendant by an undercover
officer did not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment even though the trial was held eight
months after the initial photo identification.

The court

in its analysis applied the following tests to the facts
of the case:

(1) the opportunity to view,

(2) the degree

of attention,

(3) the accuracy of the description,

(4)

the witness's level of certainty, and (5) the time between
the crime and the confrontation.
Applying this analysis to the case at bar:

first,

it was established that Mr. Harper had a two to three minute
conversation with appellant and that appellant was in the
office between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. for about five minutes
while the sun was still up (T.l5,16).

At the

ti~e

the crime

was committed, Harper had the opportunity to view appellant
for another six to ten seconds in the bright lights of the
station (T.l7,35).

This was enough time to form a mental

impression of appellant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Second, Harper testified that he likes to study
people in his job and notices their appearances (T.37).
This is a much greater level of attention to appearance
than most people observe.

Third, even though Mr. Harper

had been struck on the head, he was abl.e to give a
complete and accurate description of the appellant soon
after the attack (T.64,65).

He never wavered from that

description through the time of trial.

Fourth, Mr. Harper,

though he carefully deliberated over the photos presented
to him, had no trouble selecting that of appellant (T.22).
He further testified that there was no doubt in his mind
that appellant was the assailant (T.48).

Fifth, the

actual photo identification was made within ten to twelve
hours after the crime occurred, while Hr. Harper's memory
was still fresh.

This was about the same amount of time as

that approved in Simmons and Volberding, cited above.

Looking

to the totality of the circumstances, the identification
process in this case was permissible.
As to appellant's specific challenge to the fact
that the photograph identification was influenced unduly by
his construction of the composite drawing, the procedure used
here was that which is accepted as the standard.

The witness

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-13Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

constructs the composite from his memory which may or
may not aid in choosing from photographs.

In this case,

Harper testified that it had not been used by him at
all in picking appellant's photo from the group (T.41).

As Mr. Schumacher pointed out in his closing arguments
for the defense, the composite drawing did not resemble
appellant very closely (T.l71).
~here

were no external, suggestive elements in

the identification procedure used in this case which made
it all but inevitable that Jared Harper would identify
the appellant as his assailant, State v. Wettstein, supra.
The composite drawing was the product of Harper's memory,
which was not influenced by any suggestive conduct by the
officers involved in the identification procedure (T.57,
59).

Even if Harper had used the composite drawing in

making the photo identification, such use would not be
impermissible unless some external, suggestive influence
tainted his identification.
In the absence of some showing of an external,
suggestive influence upon Jared Harper's memory which
effected him during the identification procedure, appellant's
argument that the composite drawing impermissibly tainted
the photo identification by making it inevitable that Harper
would choose appellant's photo, fails to meet the high burden
established by the United States Supreme Court and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Utah
SupremeLibrary
Court.
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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POINT IIJ.
THE ADMISSION OF A PHOTOCOPY OF THE
COMPOSITE DRAWING IN EVIDENCE DID NOT
VIOLATE THE "BEST EVIDENCE RULE" AND EVEN
IF IT DID, ITS ADMISSION WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL
AND nvES NOT MERIT REVERSAL.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 70, provides:
(1) As tending to prove the
content of a writing, no evidence
other than the writing itself is
admissible, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, unless
the judge finds (a)that the writing
is lost or has been destroyed without
fraudulent intent on the part of the
proponent, . • .
(2) If the judge makes one of the
findings specified in the preceding
paragraph, secondary evidence of
the content of the writing is
admissible.
This is a sta+.ement of what is commonly referred to as the
"best evidence rule."

The purpose of the rule is, " . • •

to secure the most reliable information as to the contents of
documents, when those terms are disputed."
Evidence, 2nd Ed.

(1972) p. 578.

McCormick on

Appellant complains that

the admission of a photocopy of the composite drawing made by
Mr. Harper violates this rule and justifies reversal.

The

original of the composite drawing was disassembled for use in
other cases

(T. 58).

The trial court admitted the photocopy after it was
authenticated by both Mr. Harper and Officer Berhow over
objection of defense counsel (T. 77).

Defense counsel did

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-15may contain errors.

not dispute the authenticity of the photocopy, nor that it
had not been tampered with, hut only ~ected to its quality.
(T. 72-74).

Further, defense

coun~Ql

rejected the court's

proposal that the state reconstruct the compo-.:ite (T. 77).
Thus, the trial court found that the photocopy was the
best available evidence and that the destruction of the
original was not done with fraudulent intent.

It appears

from this that the situation here falls squarely within the
exception found in Rule 70(1) (a) as cited above and that
secondary evidence was admissible.
Even if this Court finds the admission of the
photocopy violated the best evidence rule, its admission did
not prejudice the substantive rights of appellant and thus
does not justify reversal of the conviction.

Section 77-42-1,

Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, provides that:
After hearing an appeal the court
must give judgment without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.
If error has been committed, it shall
not be presumed to have resulted in
prejudice. The court must be satisfied
that it has that effect before it is
warranted in reversing the judgment.
If the identification of appellant in this case
had been based solely on the composite drawing, appellant's
contention that the quality of the photocopy was objectionable

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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might have shown prejudicial error in its admission.

However,

the identification was based primarily on the photoidentification and in-court identification of appellant, and
it is extremely unlikely that the jury verdict would have
be'en different solely because they were able to view the
original as opposed to a photocopy of the composite drawing.
Further, the burden on law enforcement

officials to preserve

each original composite would necessitate an unlimited
supply of replacement parts for each composite kit.

This

would present an unreasonable burden upon the process and
would virtually assure that composites would never be used
in evidence.
POINT IV.
A WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS DOES NOT LIE ON THE
GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHERE
SUCH EVIDENCE IS MERELY CUMULATIVE AND
COULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN THE EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE.
After this appeal was taken, appellant petitioned
in the lower court for a writ of coram nobis on the ground
that he had receP-tly discovered a new witness who could
corroborate the defense of alibi presented at trial.
witness, Jane Elsmore

The

was the grandmother of Jim Hindley,

who allegedly would have testified that she observed
appellant and Mitch Powell at her house on the night of June
29, 1978.

For the reasons stated below, a writ of coram
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nobis should not be issued in a situation such as this, and
the trial court did not err in ruling that the petition did
not allege facts legally sufficient to justify the issuance
of such a writ.
In the case of State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 143, 514
P.2d 809 (1973), this Court dealt with the question of
when a writ of coram nobis is properly issued.

The defendant

in that case was convicted of first-degree murder and later
petitioned for a writ of coram nobis on the ground that a
juror had seen a picture of the victim of the murder in his
coffin during a recess of the trial.

The trial court denied

the petition, and the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the
writ of coram nobis is a common law remedy which is only
available where the defendant is wholly without other remedy.
In Gee, the writ was properly denied because the defendant
could have moved for a new trial under Section 77-38-3(2),
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.

The Court added another

reason that the writ could not issue and established the
test which a petitioner must meet:
There is an additional reason that
the writ may not issue:
it would not
have been available at common law, for
coram nobis was to correct an error of
fact.
It neither issues to correct an
error of law nor to redress an irregularity
occurring at trial, such as misconduct of
the jury, court, or officer of the court,
except under circumstances amounting to
extrinsic fraud, which in effect deprived
the petitioner of a trial on the merits.
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The writ will be issued only where
it clearly appears that the
petitioner had a valid defense in
the facts of the case, which,
without negligence on his part,
was not made because of duress,
fraud, or excusable mistake, or he
was prevented from asserting or
enjoying some legal right through
duress or fraud or excus&ble neglect;
and these facts, not appearing on
the face of the record, if timely
known, would have prevented the
rendition and entry of judgment.
514 P.2d 809, 811 (emphasis added).
In the case of Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85,
448 P.2d 907

(1968), this Court affirmed the rejection of

a petition for a writ of coram nobis on the ground of facts
allegedly discovered after the conviction which might have
changed the defendant's guilty plea.

The Court found that

such facts were known to the defendant at the time of
trial.

Concerning the nature and burden of proof in coram

nobis proceedings, the Court wrote:
Petitions in habeas corpus and
coram nobis are generally regarded
as being analagous procedurally to
civil proceedings.
The petitioner
has the burden of persuading the
trial court by a preponderance of evidence
facts which will entitle him to
relief.
448 P.2d 907, 910.
The "mistake of facts" which appellant contends
should entitle him to relief by issuance of a writ of
coram nobis is the alleged newly discovered witness whose
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testimony allegedly could not have been produced at trial.
In Butt v. Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957),
this Court considered whether allegedly newly discovered
evidence could support the issuance of a writ of coram nobis.
In

~,

the defendant was convicted of the crime of

"carnal knowledge" and later petitioned for a writ of
coram nobis on the ground that the district attorney suppressed
evidence which would have shown that no intercourse took
place.

The Court found that the defendant knew of such

evidence during the trial and thus that the trial court did
not err in denying the petition.
This Court has not directly confronted the question
of whether or not a writ of coram nobis may lie based solely
upon allegedly newly discovered evidence.

However, several

other jurisdictions have been presented with the question.
The statement of the Tennessee Court in Johnson v. Russell,
404 S.W. 2d 471 (Tenn. 1966), that:
A writ of error coram nobis will
ordinarily not lie to uermit the
review of a judgment for subsequently
or newly discovered evidence relating
to matters which have been litigated at
the trial.
404

s.w.

2d 471, 474.

is representative of the weight of authority.
Gross v. State, 412 S.W. 2d 279

See also

(Ark. 1967); Hatfield v.

State, 529 S.W. 2d 180 (Mo. App. 1975); Divine v. State,
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234 So. 2d 28 (Ala. 1970); People v. Wade, 366 N.E. 2d 528
(Ill. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Ditmore, 363 A.2d 1253
(Pa. Super, 1976); Dobie v. Commonwealth, 96 S.E. 2d 747
(Va. 1957).

These cases most often involve allegedly newly

discovered evidence which was either cumulative to that
offered at trial or ,.,.hich could have been discovered in the
exercise of reasonable diligence before trial.
Applying the test formulated in the Gee case
to the case at bar, appellant must show that the failure to
discover that Jane Elsmore had observed him on the night
of the crime was not due to his own negligence, that the
testimony which would have been offered by Jane Elsmore would
have given him a "valid defense in the facts of the case,"
Gee, supra, and that the testimony of Jane Elsmore would have
prevented the rendition of judgment against him.

Appellant

has not alleged facts sufficient to meet this burden, and
thus the trial court properly denied his petition for a
writ of coram nobis.
Appellan~ ~ad

a full opportunity to make his

defense of alibi at the trial.

The addition of any

testimony offered by Jane Elsmore would have been merely
cumulative to the evidence appellant presented.

Such

testimony would not have prevented the entry and rendition
of judgment against appellant unless (1) the jury would
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have been compelled to believe the testimony, and,

(2)

the testimony would have perfected appellant's defense
of alibi.
The jury would not have been compelled to believe
the testimony of Jane Elsmore, but would have weighed such
evidence against the testimony of other witnesses.

Appellant

testified that when he and Mitch Powell went to Mrs. Elsmore's
house to pick up Jim Hindley, appellant remained in the
car (T. 131).

Jane Elsmore apparently was on her back

porch at the time (appellant's Brief, p. 14), which makes
it unlikely that she could have personally_ observed the
appellant.
Even if the jury might have believed the testimony
which Jane Elsmore would have presented,

(see affidavit of

Jane Elsmore in Supp. Record), it would not have made
appellant's alibi defense "valid."

The crucial times which

apply to appellant's alibi defense are (1) 8:00 to 8:30p.m.,
when the perpetrator appeared at the service station for the
first time (T. 15), and (2) 9:55 to 10:00 p.m., when he
returned to the station and the crime occurred.

Jane Elsmore

observed appellant at about 9:30 p.m. according to the
testimony of both appellant (T. 131) and Mitch Powell (T. lll),
and could have observed him only until about 9:35
In her affidavit

(T. lll).

she claims to have seen appellant at
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10:00 p.m.

(See supplemental record).

Any testimony given

by her would not prove, even if belie;·:ed, that appellant
was not present at the service
the crucial times.

statio~

Such testimony

at either or both of

wo~ld

not have prevented

the jury from returning a verdict of guilty.
Finally, the failure to

dis~over

that Jane

Elsmore had observed appellant on the evening of the crime
was due to appellant's negligence.

R:asonable diligence

should have suggested to appellant anj his counsel that if
Jane Elsmore resided at a place where appellant allegedly
was on that evening, inquiry should

h~ve

been made to

determine whether or not she observed the appellant.
Although Jane Elsmore was apparently in Florida at the time
of appellant's preparation for trial, due diligence in
contacting family members of Jim Hind:ey could have disclosed
her location and she could have been served with a subpoena
for trial.

Alternatively, her

taken for use at trial.

deposi~ion

could have been

All of this shows a lack of

"excusable" neglect in appellant's fa!lure to produce the
facts which he alleges justify a new

~rial

before the

court.

Thus, the trial court did not err in jenying the ?etition
for a writ of coram nobis.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the above-cited authority and argument,
respondent prays that this Court affirm the conviction of
the appellant and the denial of a petition for writ of
coram nobis.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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